Q:
For Aristotle, the pursuit of ‘eudaimonia’ – let’s call it happiness for the moment – was the ultimate objective in life, since all other goals, be they material or spiritual, were a means to this end. He saw it as a distinguishing feature of humans that we could use our reasoning to choose actions that would attain this state: seeing through momentary pleasures, or discomforts, to fashion a life of virtue, intellectual curiosity and friendship, and through these attain a deep sense of what we would call well-being. Happiness was not just a fleeting mental state, but ‘an activity of the soul’, and one that took a lifetime to achieve: ‘for as it is not one swallow or one fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time that makes a man blessed and happy’.
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Q:
‘Radical incrementalism’ is the idea that dramatic improvements can be achieved, and are more likely to be achieved, by systematically testing small variations in everything we do, rather than through dramatic leaps in the dark. For example, the dramatic wins of the British cycling team at the 2012 London Olympics are widely attributed to the systematic testing by the team of many variations of the bike design and training schedules. Many of these led to small improvements, such as getting the cyclists to bring their own pillows when away to reduce the likelihood of getting sick and missing training, but when combined created a winning team. Similarly, many of the dramatic advances in survival rates for cancer over the last 30 years are more due to constant refinements in treatment dosage and combination than to new ‘breakthrough’ drugs.
F-test!
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Q:
Just because an approach is effective doesn’t mean that it’s right. Do nudges, and other behavioural approaches, wear off? If behavioural approaches are so powerful, should there be tighter limits and controls on those who use them, both in government and business?
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Q:
The discussion is organised around three broad areas of concern: Lack of transparency – that behavioural approaches are too close to the dark arts of propaganda and subconscious manipulation (a concern of the right). Lack of efficacy – that behavioural approaches are an excuse for not acting more decisively and effectively (a concern of the left). Lack of accountability – that the behavioural scientists and decision-makers behind these approaches need to be more answerable to those they affect (a concern of liberals and democrats).
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Q:
This is a concern that should be taken seriously. ‘Nudge-style’ approaches at their core are based on the idea that many decisions and behaviours are rooted in very rapid, often unconscious patterns of thought. If people tend to avoid the highest and lowest priced of a set of choices, be it a beer or a financial product, once sellers have this information they can ‘trick’ consumers into paying more by adding extra high-price items at the top and trimming out the lower price options. Similarly, armed with the knowledge that people strongly anchor to the default option, couldn’t governments and businesses get away with all kinds of mischief? The very automatic nature of such decision-making suggests that the skilled nudger can influence our behaviour without us even noticing.
In a strong form, one could argue that such approaches bring a lack of transparency and constrain freedom, and are even inherently antidemocratic since they are not consciously chosen by the citizens who are affected. Isn’t it, to use a word that would send shudders down the spine of any libertarian, manipulation?
It is this manipulation concern about nudging that strikes a particularly raw nerve in the USA, and one that Cass Sunstein especially had to wrestle with in the White House. It is an argument that he continues to wrestle with now that he has the freedom to write again back in academia. Similarly for Richard Thaler, always a Chicago economist at heart, this critique of nudging as ‘manipulation’ is one that he has always been extremely sensitive to.
For Sunstein and Thaler, the originators of the term ‘nudging’, their first response has always been that nudges should be both ‘choice-enhancing’ – or at least not choice-restricting – and transparent. In this sense, the nudge is to be seen as an alternative mandating or banning. For example, changing the default on a pension scheme from one that is an opt-in scheme for employees to an opt-out does not eliminate the choice. Employees are still free to opt out if they wish to do so. It is transparent what the choice is, and employees are informed by law about it. In contrast, in some western countries you are obliged to save – though you may have some choice about your pension provider.
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